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#e2ee

8 posts8 participants0 posts today
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@drew_belloc @noodlejetski @drew_belloc @noodlejetski I don't have a dock either. I do have a favourites row though, and currently these are the pinned apps (arranged in no particular order):

1. Calls by #GNOME & #Purism
2. Chats (#Chatty) by Purism & GNOME - supports #SMS, #Matrix, #XMPP
3. Contacts by GNOME
4. #Firefox web browser by #Mozilla
5. #SignalMessenger
6. GNOME Settings
7. #Phosh Mobile Settings
8. Tweaks by #postmarketOS
9. #Tuba (client for #Mastodon / #Fediverse)
10. #Kasts by #KDE
11. #DeltaChat (#openstandards-based, #securityaudited, fast #e2ee chats over bloody #email!)
12. Files / #Nautilus by GNOME

All #FreeSoftware /Libre, #OpenSource #FOSS / #FLOSS : )

Note: The home screen and the app drawer / search / overview is all one and the same.

I am moving away from #ProtonMail and my main reservation about switching to another provider is that when I don’t use end-to-end encryption (e2ee) my emails would be stored unencrypted in its server, whereas Proton Mail stores all emails with no-access encryption.

I really don’t want sensitive emails that I receive without PGP encryption (medical info, personal government communications…) to be stored without any sort of server-side encryption.

So I’m wondering if it exist some tool that encrypts emails saved in a mailserver even when they are not end-to-end encrypted. Something like @cryptomator, but for emails.

Thoughts? Tips?

(@thunderbird is the main client I would be using)

Edit: someone suggested Posteo, but I have to use my own custom domain, and Posteo does not allow it.

#Proton#PGP#GPG
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@Linux ideally switch to providers that don't demand any #PII like @monocles, which not only will onlynvomply with duely submitted subopenas in #Germany and also can only submit data they actually have.

  • If you never gave them ajy identifying info, then they can't hand those over.

And if you really care, you'll use real #E2EE LIKE #PGO/MIME (#encrypted #eMail) & #XMPP+#OMEMO so there's only encrypted jibberish at the providers' side.

If you're using Linux, and you're looking to set up encrypted network-accessible storage, I have a blog post describing how to do that using rclone.

michael.kjorling.se/blog/2024/

You can use this with any storage backend that rclone supports, which is *many*:

rclone.org/#providers

Note that you'll need to have rclone on any system you want to access your files from.

Not sure if this qualifies as a QT or addendum to social.circl.lu/@quinn/1143372

Michael Kjörling · Setting up encrypted remote storage on Linux using rclone

New Privacy Guides article 🔐✊
by me:

Encryption Is Not a Crime

The war against encryption isn't new, but the quantity of data about us that needs protection is.

Despite the senseless attacks,
it is vital that we fight back to protect the right to using end-to-end encryption.

Encryption protects us all: privacyguides.org/articles/202

www.privacyguides.org · Encryption Is Not a Crime
More from Em :official_verified:
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@LukaszOlejnik
Part of the proposed changes relates to how orgs are classified and governed under the existing surveillance law.
In the proposed revision, smaller Digital Service Providers such as Threema and Proton would be subjected to similar surveillance rules (and deadlines) as the bigger ISPs today.

They are against it, fearing (rightly) that it would impose significant costs on them, to handle authorities' requests and develop/deploy/maintain a surveillance infrastructure comparable to that already in place at bigger companies and ISPs such as Swisscom, Salt, etc.

The other change of the proposition, is the access of (near) real time metadata.

On the positive side, e2ee and message contents are explicitly excluded from the surveillance.

I'm curious to see what the final proposition will look like regarding the SMEs.

Sigh. We are, as a security community, making good progress on some old as well as some new topics. #Rust, #Go, and other memory safe systems languages are going well and having a real impact in reducing memory safety issues - which has been the most important security bug class for decades, and we are finally improving! Compartmentalization and isolation of processes and services have now become common knowledge and the minimum bar for new designs. Security and privacy by design are being honored in many new projects, and not just as lip service, but because the involved developers deeply believe in these principles nowadays. #E2EE is finally available to most end-users, both for messaging and backups.

And again and again, we are forced into having discussions (theregister.com/2025/04/03/eu_) about breaking all the progress.

Let me be clear for Nth time:
* We *cannot* build encryption systems that can only be broken by the "good guys". If they are not completely secure, foreign enemy states, organized crime, and intimate partners will break and abuse them as well. There is no halfway in this technology. Either it is secure or it isn't - for and against everybody.
* We *cannot* build safe, government-controlled censorship filters into our global messaging apps that are not totally broken under the assumption of (current or future) bad government policies and/or insider attacks at the technology providers (mayrhofer.eu.org/talk/insider-). Either one-to-one communication remains secure and private, or it doesn't (ins.jku.at/chatcontrol/).
* We *cannot* allow exploitation of open security vulnerabilities in smartphones or other devices for law enforcement. If they are not closed, they are exploitable by everybody. "Nobody but us" is an illusion, and makes everybody less secure.

My latest recorded public talk on the topic was mayrhofer.eu.org/talk/secure-m, and nothing factual has changed since then. Policymakers keep asking for a different technological reality than the one we live in, and that sort of thing doesn't tend to produce good, sustainable outcomes.

(Edited to only fix a typo. No content changes.)

CC @epicenter_works @edri @suka_hiroaki @heisec @matthew_d_green @ilumium

The Register · EU: These are scary times – let's backdoor encryption!By Iain Thomson
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@kenobit ho letto e condivido tutto.
Solo una accortezza: #XMPP non è cifrato #E2EE. Se posso fidarmi di te, non ho idea di chi sia il tuo host o, se lo tieni a casa, il tuo ISP.
Ed in ogni caso, a queste condizioni, compromettere un nodo significa esporre molta gente a rischio.